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There is now widespread agreement that participation in a currency union suppresses or, at 
the very least, constrains standard national economic stabilisation channels. At European 
level there is currently very little automatic fiscal stabilisation, leading to insufficient capacity 
to deal with severe shocks. 
Discussion of how to address that deficiency has now moved from analysis to prescription. 
Already two years ago, the Commission's "Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and 
Monetary Union" proposed that there should be an EMU-wide fiscal capacity, acting notably 
as a supranational automatic stabiliser, in particular in case of asymmetric shocks. Similar 
sentiment was expressed in the same year in the so-called 'Four presidents' report' "Towards 
a genuine Economic and Monetary Union". The commitment was reaffirmed in 2013 in the 
Communication on the Social Dimension of EMU.  
In all of these official pronouncements, no time horizon or only a very long time horizon is 
envisaged. As a result, while various options have been debated on an exploratory basis, no 
specific official proposals for the implementation of a fiscal capacity have been made. 
Different policy options are currently being studied and discussed (see Beblavý, Gros and 
Maselli, 2014). One proposal consists of a harmonised scheme for eurozone countries based 
on an insurance fund financed through a payroll tax (collected by national agencies) and 
spent on a minimum standard of unemployment benefits that applies in the same fashion to 
all eligible workers. 
We also believe that the time to make such a proposal for an EU-level shock absorption 
mechanism has come. In our view, however, the instrument that best aligns varying political 
and economic objectives is a form of reinsurance of national systems of unemployment 
insurance. It could be a sort of ‘tornado shelter’ fund, which will be used only in case of 
severe recessions, in light of the fact that ‘business as usual’ downturns are already covered 
by existing policies. The primary motivation for the reinsurance proposal is that it can have 
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a substantial stabilising effect, especially in case of large shocks, and, at the same time, be 
politically realistic in terms of contributions, costs and administrative burdens. 
Recent studies by the IMF (2013a and 2013b) find that about 20% of shocks to state income in 
the US are offset by the federal fiscal system. Had the EMU being equipped with such a 
system, however, it would have been of limited value during the crisis. Offering a country 
whose output falls by 1% (relative to the eurozone average) a transfer of 0.2% of GDP would 
be of very limited utility. A country hit by a very large shock, say 5% of GDP (like Portugal 
or Ireland) would of course receive a larger transfer, but the problems would not be 
substantially different (a fall of income by 4% instead of 5%). By contrast, in a system of 
insurance with a deductible of say 1% of GDP, the country hit by a small shock would receive 
nothing. But most of the large shock – everything above the 1% deductible – could then be 
offset. 
What the eurozone really needs is not a system that offsets all shocks by some small fraction, 
but a system that protects against shocks that are rare, but potentially catastrophic. The many 
minor cyclical shocks that do not impair the functioning of financial markets can then be 
dealt with via borrowing at the national level, and all countries are (more or less) well 
equipped with labour market cushions. 
The European Stability Mechanism – the eurozone’s rescue mechanism – does not provide 
the needed insurance function because it only provides loans, which have to be repaid with 
interest, rather than a transfer when a shock materialises. 
One way to create an insurance mechanism with a deductible would be to create a system of 
reinsurance for national unemployment insurance systems, under which the national 
systems would pay regular premiums to a central eurozone fund. This fund would then 
support the national system in countries where the unemployment rate has increased 
suddenly above a certain threshold. This is the type of absorption capacity that the Presidents 
of the EU should be considering – not merely copying the way the US federal fiscal system 
appears to offset a small proportion of all shocks. 
From a political point of view, a shock absorption mechanism would be an important 
demonstration of European solidarity but one that did not entail permanent transfers. This 
could mark an important shift of the political discourse from redistribution to how to make 
Europe work better for all its citizens. Moreover, the reinsurance of national unemployment 
insurance systems could serve as pilot project for other policies that might need a form of 
supranational reinsurance in the future.  
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